Investigative powers
The Commission's investigative powers are set out in Chapter V of Regulation 1/2003, the two main instruments being requests for information (Article 18) and inspections (Articles 20 and 21). 7 Under Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can require undertakings and associations of undertakings to provide all necessary information (i.e. either to hand over existing documents or to provide answers to questions) specified in the request within the time-limit fixed in the request. The Commission may, under Article 23(1)(b) of Regulation 1/2003, impose a fine of up to 1 % of their total turnover in the preceding business year on undertakings or associations of undertakings which, intentionally or negligently, supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information or do not supply information within the required time- Under Article 19 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may also interview any natural or legal person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject-matter of the investigation, but this 'power to take statements' is a weaker power, in the absence of any obligation or any penalties, not even for providing misleading information. limit. Article 24(1)(d) of Regulation 1/2003 allows the Commission to impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year per day in order to compel undertakings or associations of undertakings to supply complete and correct information which it has requested by decision. 8 Under Article 20 of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of undertakings. The officials and other persons authorised by the Commission to conduct the inspection have the power to enter any premises of the undertaking or association of undertakings, to examine all business-related records and to take or obtain copies or extracts from such records. Article 20(2)(d) of Regulation 1/2003 allows the Commission inspectors to seal any business premises and books or records for the period and to the extent necessary for the inspection. Under Article 20(2)(e), they are also empowered "to ask any representative or member of staff of the undertaking or association of undertakings for explanations on facts or documents relating to the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection and to record the answers". Under Article 23(1)(c), (d) and (e) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can impose on the undertaking or association a fine of up to 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year where, intentionally or negligently, it produces business records in incomplete form, refuses to submit to inspections ordered by decision, or fails to provide, in response to a question asked in accordance with Article 20(2)(c), a complete answer on facts relating to the subject-matter and purpose of an inspection ordered by decision, 9 or where seals have been broken. 10 Pursuant to Article 24(1)(e) of Regulation 1/2003, the 8 Where the Commission has made the request for information not in the form of a decision but in the form of a simple request, the undertaking or association of undertakings is not obliged to respond. Only if the undertaking or association, intentionally or negligently, provides incorrect or misleading information can it be penalised by the Commission under Article 23(1)(a) of Regulation 1/2003 with a fine of up to 1 % of its total turnover in the preceding business year. 9 Where the Commission chooses to conduct an inspection not on the basis of a decision but on the basis of a simple authorisation, the undertaking or association of undertakings is not obliged to submit to it. However, under Article 23(1)(c) and (d) of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission can impose on the undertaking or association a fine of up to 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year where, intentionally or negligently, it produces the required business-related records in incomplete form or where, in response to a question asked under Article 20(2)(e), it gives an incorrect or misleading answer, or fails to correct within a time-limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or misleading answer given by a member of staff.
Regulation 1/2003 does not provide for any penalty to be imposed on members of staff for failing to provide answers or for providing incorrect, incomplete or misleading answers in response to questions asked during an inspection. Penalties can only be imposed on the undertaking that fails to correct within a time-limit set by the Commission an incorrect, incomplete or misleading answer given by a member of staff; see further B. Vesterdorf, ' Commission can also impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5 % of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year per day in order to compel undertakings or associations to submit to an inspection ordered by decision. Moreover, Article 20(6) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that, where the Commission officials conducting the inspection find that an undertaking opposes an inspection ordered by decision, the Member State concerned shall afford them the necessary assistance of the police or of an equivalent enforcement authority, so as to enable them to conduct their inspection. 11 Article 21 of Regulation 1/2003 gives the Commission the power to order by decision an inspection of any other premises, including the homes of directors, managers and other members of staff of the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned, if a reasonable suspicion exists that books or other records related to the business and to the subject-matter of the inspection, which may be relevant to prove a serious violation of Article 101 or Article 102 of the Treaty, are being kept in those premises. As in the case of inspection of business premises, officials and other persons authorised by the Commission to conduct the inspection have the power to examine all business-related records and to take or obtain copies or extracts, but they have no power to seal or ask for explanations provides that the Commission can request such assistance, or -interestingly -the national competition authority has the right to provide such assistance at its own request. The assisting national 11 Apart from the possibility for the Commission itself to impose fines or periodic penalty payments to compel undertakings to submit to an inspection, the Commission thus relies on the authorities of the Member State in whose territory the inspection takes place to overcome opposition to its inspections. The Commission inspectors cannot themselves use any force.
In application of the General EU law principles of effectiveness and of equivalence (see (text accompanying) note 18 below), the assistance which the Member States provide to overcome opposition to Commission inspections must be effective, and at least equivalent to what the Member State would provide for in comparable situations of enforcement of its own national law.
Ultimately the effectiveness of the fines and periodic penalty payments which the Commission can impose under Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003 to compel undertakings to submit to inspections or to answer requests for information, and to punish the provision of incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, also depends on assistance by the Member States. Indeed, if the company were to refuse to pay the fine or penalty payment, the Commission would make use of Article 299 TFEU, which provides that a national authority designated for this purpose by the Member State in the territory of which the Commission decision imposing the financial penalty is to be executed shall append an order for its enforcement to the Commission decision, allowing that decision to be enforced according to the rules of civil procedure in force in that Member State. 
Where on the basis of the information in their possession the conditions for prohibition are not met they may likewise decide that there are no grounds for action on their part."
Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 thus determines which types of decisions national competition authorities can take (and, conversely, which types of decisions they cannot take, notably findings of inapplicability or non-infringement decisions). 24 In contrast with the more detailed provisions of Regulation 1/2003 concerning the Commission's decision-making powers, Article 5 leaves a number of important questions unanswered, for instance whether national competition authorities can impose not only behavioural but also structural remedies, and the maximum amount of the fines and periodic penalty payments. These issues are thus in principle left to the national law of each Member State, together with the question what other penalties (e.g. director disqualification or imprisonment), if any, are provided for.
Whilst in principle the national law of each Member State thus determines, within the framework of Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003, the precise decision-making powers of the national competition authorities, the general EU law principles of equivalence and effectiveness again apply. 25 Under the principle of equivalence, for instance, a Member State which provides for imprisonment as a penalty in relation to a cartel prohibition in national law must do the same in relation to the cartel prohibition in Article 101 TFEU. 26 The principle of effectiveness requires, for instance, that the penalties imposed by national competition authorities are of a sufficient level to be effective. 27 In VEBIC, the Court of Justice also held that Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 must be interpreted as precluding national rules which do not allow a national competition authority to participate, as a defendant or respondent, in judicial proceedings brought against a decision that the authority itself has taken. 28
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND GUARANTEES
A number of procedural rights and guarantees circumscribe or limit the competition authorities' (use of) enforcement powers. To give just a few examples:
Article 18 of Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that the Commission can only make requests for information "in order to carry out the duties assigned to it by this Regulation" and that the request or decision "shall stipulate the legal basis and purpose of the request". The Court of Justice has clarified that this implies that the request must identify, "with reasonable precision", the suspected infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, and that it can only be made if "the Commission could reasonably suppose, at the time of the request, that the document [or other information requested] would help it to determine whether the alleged 25 See text accompanying note 18 above. According to the AM&S judgment of the Court of Justice, the Commission cannot use its powers of investigation to take or to compel the production of lawyerclient communications made for the purpose and in the interests of the client's rights of defence and emanating from independent lawyers (legal professional privilege). 31 As to inspections in private homes, Article 21(3) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that a Commission decision ordering such inspection "cannot be executed without prior authorisation from the national judicial authority of the Member State concerned".
Article 27(1) of Regulation 1/2003 provides that, before taking a decision finding an infringement, ordering its termination, ordering interim measures and/or imposing fines and/or periodic penalty payments, "the Commission shall give the undertakings or associations of undertakings which are the subject of the proceedings conducted by the Commission the opportunity to be heard on the matters to which the Commission has taken objection. The Commission shall base its decisions only on objections on which the parties concerned have been able to comment". Article 27(2) adds that the parties concerned "shall be entitled to have access to the Commission's file, subject to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets. 
A. European Commission
Procedural requirements applicable to the European Commission's antitrust enforcement proceedings mainly flow from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter also: "the Charter" and "CFREU"), the European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter also: "the Convention" and " 35 See the works referred to in note 1 above. 39 See also the last subparagraph of Article 6(1) TFEU: "The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII [Articles 51 to 54] of the Charter governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions."
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU

The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States." 40
According to the explanation of Article 52(3) CFREU, the meaning and scope of rights which correspond to those guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights are to be determined not only by reference to the text of the Convention, but also, inter alia, by reference to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. 41 For 42 , Article 41 (right to good administration, including inter alia the right to be heard and the right to have access to one's file) 43 , Article 47 (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) 44 Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice."
and right of defence) 45 , Article 49 (principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties) 46 and Article 50 (right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence) 47 .
According to the Explanations to the Charter: 48
• Article 7 CFREU (respect for private life) has the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8 ECHR;
• Paragraphs 1 and 2, (a) and (b), of Article 41 CFREU (right to good administration) are based on the case-law of the EU Courts recognizing general principles of EU law, whereas paragraph 2, (c) and paragraphs 3 and 4 reproduce Article 296 TFEU, Article 340 TFEU, and Articles 20(2)(d) and 25 TFEU;
• The first paragraph of Article 47 CFREU (right to an effective remedy) is based on Article 13 ECHR, but is more extensive in that it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court, reflecting a general principle of EU law recognized in the case-law of the Court of Justice, whereas the second and third paragraphs of Article 47 CFREU (right to a fair trial) have the same meaning as Article 6(1) ECHR, but a wider scope in that they are not limited to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges;
• Article 48 CFREU (presumption of innocence and right of defence) has the same meaning and scope as Article 6(2) and (3) ECHR;
45 "Article 48 Presumption of innocence and right of defence 1. Everyone who has been charged shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 2. Respect for the rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed."
"Article 49
Principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties 1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national law or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of a criminal offence, the law provides for a lighter penalty, that penalty shall be applicable. 2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles recognised by the community of nations. 3. The severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence."
"Article 50
Right not be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law."
48 As note 40 above, explanations on the Articles concerned and explanations on Article 52; see also DEB v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, as note 41 above, paragraph 32.
• Article 49(1) and (2) CFREU (principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties) have the same meaning and scope as Article 7 ECHR, 49 whereas Article 49(3) CFREU (principle of proportionality of penalties) is based on the common constitutional traditions of the EU Member States and the case-law of the Court of Justice;
• Article 50 CFREU (right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence) has the same meaning as Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, but its scope is extended in that it applies not only within the jurisdiction of one State, but within the European Union.
Finally, Article 52(1) of the Charter contains the following provision concerning limitations on the exercise of these rights:
"Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others."
There can be no doubt that the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU constitutes an "objective of general interest recognised by the Union". 50 The importance of the requirement that limitations must be "provided for by law" is illustrated by the Knauf case. The Court of Justice overturned the judgment of the General Court which had held that a company could not challenge before the General Court for the first time a point which it had not contested in the administrative procedure before the Commission. The Court of Justice held that, "in the absence of a specific legal basis", there could be no such limitation of the rights to an effective remedy and of access to an independent tribunal as guaranteed by Article 47 CFREU. 51 regulation can be regarded as "provided for by law" within the meaning of Article 52(1) CFREU. 52
European Convention on Human Rights
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Courts already drew inspiration from the European Convention on Human Rights (to which all EU Member States are contracting parties) 53 , and from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting the Convention, when developing general principles of EU law. 54 As explained above, 55 Many of the claims of incompatibility of EU antitrust procedures with the Convention appear to be based on reasoning along the following lines: Primo, EU antitrust enforcement is "criminal" within the meaning of the Convention. Secundo, some judgment of the European Court of Human Rights appears to require in some criminal case a procedural right or guarantee which does not appear to be available in EU antitrust proceedings. Ergo, EU antitrust proceedings are incompatible with the Convention.
Such reasoning is liable to lead to erroneous conclusions to the extent that it disregards the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which distinguishes, as to the level of protection required by the Convention, according to the circumstances of the particular case: "While the right to a fair trial under Article 6 [ECHR] is an unqualified right, what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case." 61 Particularly relevant in the context of EU antitrust procedures are the distinction between the hard core of criminal law and other areas of the law which are only criminal within the Convention's wider meaning of "criminal", and the distinction between natural persons and companies. 62 As I have explained in more detail elsewhere, 63 , the body of safeguards developed in the field of criminal law, which has as its protagonists the penalising State, on the one hand, and the individual charged with an offence on the other, is not transferred en bloc to the field of competition law. Those safeguards are designed specifically to compensate for that imbalance of power. In the case of free competition, those parameters are altered, since it is sought to protect the community of individuals which constitutes society and is composed of groups of consumers against powerful corporations with significant resources. To accord such offenders the same procedural safeguards as those accorded to the most needy individuals, apart from being a mockery, would entail, essentially, a lower degree of protection, in this case economic protection, for the individual as the main victim of anti-competitive conduct. I therefore consider it important that the procedural rules be adapted to the specific field of competition. However, as is apparent from the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Jussila v Finland, 65 the European Court of Human Rights distinguishes, within the broad range of procedures or penalties that are "criminal" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, between the "hard core of criminal law", and "cases not strictly belonging to the traditional categories of the criminal law", which "differ from the hard core of criminal law". Antitrust enforcement such as that done by the European Commission, which only involves the imposition on companies of fines that are not classified as "criminal" under domestic law, belongs to the second category, outside the hard core of criminal law. The criminal-head guarantees laid down in Article 6 ECHR do "not necessarily apply with their full stringency" to cases belonging to the second category, outside the hard core of criminal law. 66 An example of this differential treatment, specifically mentioned in Jussila v Finland, 67 concerns the compatibility with Article 6 ECHR of the imposition of criminal fines, at first instance, by an administrative or non-judicial body that combines investigative and decision-making powers. Whereas in cases belonging to the hard core of criminal law Article 6 ECHR requires that penalties are imposed by an independent tribunal at first instance, it is not contrary to Article 6 ECHR for penalties belonging to the second category, outside the hard core of criminal law, to be imposed, at first instance, by an administrative or non-judicial body that combines investigative and decision-making powers, provided that there is a possibility of appeal "before a judicial body that has full jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and of law, the challenged decision". 68 The fact that in the EU antitrust enforcement system, the European Commission both investigates and takes the first-instance decision is thus not incompatible with the Convention. 69 The distinction between natural persons and companies may also be relevant for the level of protection offered by the Convention. 70 For instance, while the European Court of Human Rights has held that the protection of the home provided for in Article 8 ECHR may in certain circumstances be extended to cover business premises, it has also held that public authorities' entitlement to interfere with this right, in accordance with Article 8(2) ECHR, "might well be more far-reaching where professional or business activities or premises were involved than would otherwise be the case". 71 The European Court of Human Rights has also, for example, as regards the grant of legal aid, accepted a difference in treatment between natural persons and legal persons, as well as a difference in treatment between profit-making companies, on the one hand, and natural persons and non-profit-making legal persons, on the other. 72 As I have explained in detail elsewhere, 73 the difference between natural persons and legal persons may also be relevant for the privilege against selfincrimination. 74 All existing judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence were given in cases concerning natural persons. 75 No case concerning a legal person has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights yet. However, the German Constitutional Court has held that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the German Constitution does not extend to legal persons, because it is grounded in the protection of individual human dignity. 76 Similarly, under the U.S. Constitution, legal persons cannot invoke the privilege against selfincrimination. 77
General principles of EU law
Article 6(3) TEU states: "Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law".
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, general principles of EU law (or "general principles of Community law" as they were called at the time) were, apart from regulations, the main source of procedural rights. 78 Given that, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has the same legal value as the Treaties, and given that the Charter contains the rights guaranteed by the Convention, and also draws upon the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, general principles of EU law are now only a subsidiary and complementary source of procedural rights, which may serve to fill any lacunae in the Charter. .pdf, at 8-9: "My feeling is that, from the point when the EU develops a binding set of fundamental rights, it will no longer be necessary to refer to the general principles of law and consequently to the common constitutional traditions and the ECHR as a parallel or "concurrent and equivalent" source for fundamental rights; they will merely form a subsidiary and complementary source. Accordingly, 
Commission statements and practice
The Commission has often imposed on itself procedural rules exceeding the requirements laid down in the case-law of the EU Courts or in regulations or other binding acts. 85 When information is collected by one competition authority (the transmitting authority) and exchanged through the European Competition Network to be used by another competition authority (the receiving authority), this information can thus always be used as intelligence by the receiving authority. As to its use in evidence, a distinction is made between the use to impose sanctions on natural persons, and the use to impose sanctions on legal persons. The receiving authority can only use the information in evidence to impose custodial sanctions if the law of the transmitting authority foresees such sanctions in relation to violations of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. As to other kinds of sanctions on natural persons (such as fines, or director disqualification), the receiving authority can use the exchanged information in evidence if either the law of the transmitting authority 94 As note 5 above.
foresees the same kind of sanctions or the information has been collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving authority. As to sanctions on legal persons, the receiving authority can always use the exchanged information in evidence if this information has been lawfully collected according to the law applicable to the transmitting authority. This is the case even if, according to national law, the receiving authority could not have collected this information itself, or could not have used the information if it had collected it.
This means for instance that the Office of Fair Trading, which itself under United Kingdom law cannot use its own powers of investigation to take or compel undertakings to give up certain correspondence with in-house legal counsel, could receive and use in evidence such information if collected by the European Commission or the German or French competition authorities, given that in EU law and in the national laws of Germany, France, and indeed most other Member States, legal professional privilege does not cover in-house lawyers. 95 This potential for a receiving authority to use in evidence exchanged information which it could not have collected itself, or could not have used if it had collected it, has been criticised in the literature as an "unacceptable" "circumvention" of procedural rights and guarantees, "that may erode fundamental rights". 96 Such fears appear to be unwarranted. First, the problem only concerns legal persons, not natural persons. 97 Secondly, as also explained above, 98 97 See text accompanying notes 93 to 95 above. 98 See text accompanying notes 88 to 92 above. 99 Including for example the Orkem and AM&S case law; see (text accompanying) notes 30 and 31 above.
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The "eroded fundamental rights" can thus only be rights of legal persons which are recognised neither in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights nor in the fundamental rights case-law of the Court of Justice. Indeed, it is difficult to find examples beyond that concerning legal privilege for in-house counsel. 100 The arguments for extending legal professional privilege to in-house lawyers are however very weak. It is difficult to see how the possibility to consult in confidence an independent lawyer is insufficient to guarantee the rights of defence, thereby creating a need to extend legal professional privilege to in-house counsel. Indeed, there is a wide choice of independent lawyers companies could turn to, and those companies which can afford to have in-house counsel can undoubtedly also afford to pay an independent lawyer. 101 Finally, if an "erosion of fundamental rights" were ever seen to be happening, one could safely expect the EU Courts and the courts of the Member States with a lower level of protection to react by increasing procedural rights and guarantees. 102
III. SUMMARY
With the exception of its Articles 12 and 22(1) (which allow competition authorities to assist each other in their investigations) and Article 5 (which determines the types of decisions national competition authorities can take), In principle, the procedural rights and guarantees applicable to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by the national competition authorities are those provided for in the national law of the Member State concerned. All Member States are contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU is also applicable to the enforcement of
